Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Political Writings

Although the Marquis de Condorcet welcomed the French revolution, his critique of the execution of Louix XVI led to his condemnation as an enemy of the republic of France. It was Condorcet’s believe that a conspiracy between priest and king as models of government were responsible for the greatest assault on the rights of man which constituted the largest body of his political work.

Condorcet’s ideas paved the way for a new kind of nationalism, one born out of the individual man’s pursuit of self-interest. The individual improvement of man would make for a stronger thread for which the fabric of a national identity would eventually be composed. In a way, though the individualism born out of the ideas of hobbes, locke, rousseau, Condorcet, and others, would usher in a relatively quick decline of the European states, it bred the ascendancy of the modern superpower in the form of American nationalism.

Condorcet’s rationalism was a key component of the French enlightenment, paving the way for the enumeration of the rights of man, stated in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. “After long periods of error, after being led astray by fake were incomplete theories, publicists have at last discovered the true rights of man and how they can all be deduced from the single truth, that man is a sentient being, capable of reasoning and of acquiring moral ideas. . . .

At last man could proclaim aloud his right, which for so long had been ignored, to submit all opinions to his own reason and to use in the search for truth the only instruments for its recognition that he has been given. Every man learnt with a sort of pride that nature had not forever condemned him to base his beliefs on the opinions of others; the superstitions of antiquity and the basement of reason before the [rapture] of supernatural religion disappeared from society as from philosophy.”

Condorcet’s abandonment of religion can be compared to the evolution of thought in Hobbes’ Leviathan. Since the idea of the body of Christ no longer exists for Hobbes, he can have no view of any transcendant power that unifies human nature into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. The very foundation for understanding any transcendant view of human nature, and thus community life, is eradicated. The application and reason to understand and apply the biblical command to love is rooted in the idea that there exists something greater than the individual which motivates an individual to think less of himself and more of someone or something else, thus forming a basic link or connection to the second thing and creating in effect a third thing. When government is a necessary beast, existing on a basis of practical despotism, government becomes a negative, not a positive, thing. Its role is divisionary, separatist, and keeping one person from another, because the assumption is that the activity is a violent activity. The individual is the only thing that can exist for Hobbes, and that individual’s motives to move about arise out of self-interest and fear.

1. Condorcet lists equality between nations as a hope for a better condition for the future of the human race. How does this compare to the declarations of rights of man’s assumption that sovereignty resides in the nation?

2. What are the effects of rousseau’s rationalism on state local sovereignty?

3. is the declaration of the rights of man an decidedly atheist document? (man is capable of reasoning and acquiring moral ideas)

4. What is the general will?

5. Just how important is Liberty to God?

Gertrude Himmelfarb. The Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenment. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2004

As contrasts to the origin and nature of Government, Hobbes and Locke posit competing views to the nature of humanity, authority, and political community. Hobbes, writing amidst the great struggle of the English civil war but in the safety of Parisian life, wrote in defense of the monarchy in England. He argued that society is nothing more than a collection of selfish individuals who must be kept from devolving into such absolute chaos that a concentration of power is the most philosophically reasonable justification for the sovereignty of a king. (Kirk 271) Locke on the other hand wrote his primary treatises on government after the civil war and culmination of the Glorious Revolution in 1688; and, after the publications of Hobbes. Ultimately, power rests within the grasp of the common people. Those who are governed ought to compose that Body of those who govern them. The people may delegate their power to a body of parliament, but under conditions of tyranny may use their strength to lawfully oppose such tyranny. (Kirk 284)

Hobbes’ Leviathian, i.e. the absolute authority of the state, is predicated on his understanding of human nature. Although Hobbes is quick to divorce almost all of Christian authority from the affairs of politics, he is certainly influenced by Reformation thought regarding the nature and humanity of man. People are by nature bent on anarchy and chaos, and would live by the sword against each other because of a savage and selfish nature. True, men are depraved, but Hobbes does not account for the role of common grace and the restraining influence of that grace on the evils of man.

In one great and terrible blow Hobbes reduces almost all Christian thought to mere rationalism and secularism. The classical and Christian tradition of natural law becomes merely a set of rules man has evolved over time to maintain order and peace with one another. Christian kingship is no longer necessary even if kingship in general is necessary. These principles have no divine or eternal origin. Even though Hobbes is consistent with Reformation’s low view of human nature, he completely substitutes the Leviathan for the Christian understanding of grace and the body of Christ.

Since the idea of the body of Christ no longer exists for Hobbes, he can have no view of any transcendant power that unifies human nature into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. The very foundation for understanding any transcendant view of human nature, and thus community life, is eradicated. The application and reason to understand and apply the biblical command to love is rooted in the idea that there exists something greater than the individual which motivates an individual to think less of himself and more of someone or something else, thus forming a basic link or connection to the second thing and creating in effect a third thing. When government is a necessary beast, existing on a basis of practical despotism, government becomes a negative, not a positive, thing. Its role is divisionary, separatist, and keeping one person from another, because the assumption is that the activity is a violent activity. The individual is the only thing that can exist for Hobbes, and that individual’s motives to move about arise out of self-interest and fear.

This concept influenced the founders and continues to influence America today more than anybody has yet realized. In colonial America there existed such conditions ripe for the propagation of individualism.

1. Locke argues that reparation and restraint are the only two justifications for one man doing harm to another, what he calls punishment. (272). Is such punishment diminishing of Christ’s punishment that he took on the cross? Isaiah 53:5 But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed.

2. Should punishment be a role of government? Discipline yes, punishment no?

3. Given Christ’s command to turn the other cheek, scripture’s admonishment for self-sacrifice, and love of neighbor, do we indeed have a “Right to reparation” and Locke claims? (273)

4. Is the invention of money a boon or a blessing to the furtherance of an economic state? Locke argues that it allows us to increase our stores beyond what is necessary…and thus creates property more than can be used, and desires to accumulate more than can be used. Is this helpful or hurtful to living in a harmonious state?

Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition. (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2003)

The story of the English Revolution is a story of the development of parliament and the struggle for power between Monarch and Parliament, Parliament and Monarch. From absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy, the evolution of political and legal organization was determined by the power struggles of England’s rulership and the constant back and forth between politically-sanctioned Catholicism and politically-sanctioned Protestantism, in all their various forms. At one point in the history both ends of the spectrum were given sanction, including anglo-catholics and conforming puritans. The two groups left out however were the extreme branches, Non-Conforming Puritans and hyper Roman Catholics.

Prior to 1640 and the Cromwellian insurgency Mother England was governed by an absolute monarchy. By 1689 not only had a party system emerged with major forms of power, but Parliament (with a capital P) was the defacto head of the Church of England). In the judiciary circuit, in 1640 judges were appointed and served at the will of the monarch and exercised justice as was proportionate to the whims of the King. By 1689 justices were given independence of the crown, and the common law court system was made supreme over all other courts, (including the powerful prerogative courts established by the Tudor monarchs) and common law itself became the constitutional law of England. Jury and judge became separate and independent of one another, witness and evidence systems were established, and the doctrine of precedent was given its modern meaning.

In response to the growing popularity of natural reason as the foundation of jurisprudence, King James I and Jean Bodin argue that “through law the ruler keeps order in society just as through law God keeps order in nature. Reason, in King James’ philosophy is not immanent in nature and in society, as it was believed to be by most scholastic theologians and philosophers ever since Saint Anselm and Abelard.” (235) In any state of nature, James argued, headship is necessary and the most similar form to that of the nature of God this can take is in the form of kingship. This authority bears out on society patterned after that of Christ to the Church, and soul to the body. “Kingship in [James] theory, is the soul of the body politic.” (235)

Jean Bodin’s major polemic work targeted the French Heugenot conception of divided sovereignty. However, Bodin was not in total opposition to the possibility of an aristocratic order. He merely argued instead that monarchy was far preferable. Francis Bacon made similar claims across the chanel in King James’ court, and argued that as nature requires and produces government, thus “government requires and produces law.” Anything other than absolute monarchy, Bacon claimed, “were apt to dissolve.”As god’s representative to earthly rule, kings are required by God to fulfill the divine commandment to “maintain justice in their kingdoms and to observe the principles of natural law, that is, the principles of reason and conscience.”

Jean Gerson wrote that “all law, including English law has its ultimate sources in the natural law of reason, the eternal law of God, general customs, and general legal principles.” 232

Does Gerson place too much emphasis on reason for the derivation of law?

Hooker asserts that law “is founded in will and politics and in the corruption of human nature, which requires, for the sake of sociability itself, submission to the commands of a political authority. Government is the result of man’s natural inclination to sociability; all particular forms of government, however are the result of man’s express or tacit consent to submit to those particular forms…” 233

If government is the natural result of man’s sociability, and if man had sociability before the fall, would hooker argue that government is prelapsarian?

Does the shift towards Constitutional Monarchy indicate changes in social mores?

Coke did not deny the validity of King Jame’s version of natural law theory…was he right then to shift English common law and define it in historical terms?

Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition. (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2003)

In his discussion of the origins and influence of the Protestant Reformation on Western legal tradition, Harold Berman examines the beginnings of the Lutheran Reformation in Germany and its successors as a changing of the political landscape rife with potential for the re-examination of the conceptualization of law. Berman begins by stating the importance of Reformation thought to Western society’s conceptualization of law. He says first of all that law is a product of the protestant and catholic traditions, an heir to spiritual and human traditions interpreting our notions of justice. Second, that without a knowledge and understanding of past influence on modern conceptualization, there can be no commitment to future principles. Third, our legal heritage is rooted historically in different forms of Christian faith. And finally, that reformation thought keeps in mind the religious dimension of legal tradition, arising out of spiritual and moral motivation, not mere human invention.

One of the most fundamental elements to a Lutheran conception of law was a shift from a “two swords” to “two kingdoms” theory of law. Certainly Luther tended towards heavy dualism in his understanding of church/state governance, but his overall shift in thinking from Roman Catholic interaction of spiritual and secular powers to heavenly and earthly kingdoms and their respective Law / Gospel divide, prompted a fundamental shift in the Western conception of Law.

The Catholic church had, up to this point, adhered to the “two swords” theory proclaimed by Gregory VII. This approach saw the church as a lawmaking institution, and as Gregory advocates, superior in jurisdiction to secular, or royal, power. Catholicism elevated human will and reason to the point of salvation by works. This fundamentally optimistic view of human nature says that “despite man’s sinfulness, his will and reason were thought to remain capable of obtaining a ‘natural’…perfectibility. In addition, the sacrament of baptism forgives humanity’s original sin.

Luther objected strongly to such a view, arguing instead that the earthly kingdom is in the order of sin and death. Therefore, it must be governed by the Law. Luther perceived a distinct heavenly kingdom of grace and faith which is governed by the gospel, that is the justification of faith by faith alone, qualifying humanity for God’s free gift of salvation. This left the earthly kingdom’s Law separate and distinct from heavenly jurisdiction and thus became an order of the secular realm. Politics and law are not, as traditionally seen, a path to grace and faith (The primary political understanding of the Roman Catholic church).

Here we arrive at the fundamental difference in the two realms of thought. Luther flips these two around and argues instead that grace and faith are a path towards the right politic and the right law. Berman argues that, “Lutheran reformers taught that it is the duty of Christians “to work the work of God in the world,” and to use their will and reason, however defective, to do as much good and to attain as much understanding as possible.” 42

“God himself ordained and established this temporal realm and its distinctions, and we must remain and work in them so long as we are on earth.”

1. In characterizing Luther’s fundamental orientation to earthly kingdom and humanity, Berman states “politics and law are not a path to grace and faith…but are not grace and faith a path to the right politics and the right law? Here Luther was torn between his belief in man’s essential wickedness and his belief that that wickedness itself, and the earthly realm which embodies it, are ordained by God.”

(43)

Which of these views does Luther ultimately gravitate towards?

2. Berman states “It is an essential tenet of the Lutheran doctrine of creation that sinful man is a creature of God and that God is present, though hidden, in the earthly realm…it is the duty of Christians to work the work of God in the world and use their will and reason to do as much good and attain as much understanding as possible.” (43)

How does this view differ from the Roman Catholic understanding and is Luther’s view properly rooted in a Biblical ethic?

3. Berman argues the fundamental difference between Lutheranism and Calvinism is where authority in ecclesiastical matters lies. Luther says they lie in the territorial prince, Calvin argues for the elders of the local congregation. Why does an theology otherwise in agreement render two such differing authorities? (58)

4. Berman states of the shift in legal jurisdiction in the church… “What has traditionally been a called a process of secularization of the spiritual law of the church must thus also be viewed as a process of spiritualization of the secular law of the state.” (65) This arises out of the massive body of ordinances drawn up to govern secular areas. Given the historical progression of this trend (falling closer to the secularization side of the map), would Calvin’s understanding of authority have begotten a different effect? I.E. if the elders drafted the law and left law in the realm of the church, as opposed to Luther’s princes, might we be living in a different society today?

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

“Rights sanctioned by men for their own advantage were very various, and changed with the social expectations and the times…Though man is an animal, he is an extraordinary one. And among the distinctive features of human behavior …is a desire for society.” Fundamental to the ordering of a peacable and just society is the nature of humanity to organize by their human rational capacities. This separates them from other animals because to use one’s human intelligence and acting upon a series of well-formed judgments is appropriate to human nature.

This discussion of human nature presupposes what Hugo Grotius calls “Right”. It is the concept that in creating human kind and endowing them with his image, that this bears certain implications for how man lives together and how God is concerned with human affairs. One of Grotius’ famously misinterpreted lines “even if we were to accept the infamous premise that God did not exist” is in the context of the discussion of Right, which Grotius argues would still be legitimate to human nature without God. However, he claims it bears even more gravity because of God. This Right bears the natural law that man must obey God without qualification. We owe it as much to ourselves as to our Creator, owning possessing nothing apart from him.

Some would divide the complete conception of right into Natural Right and Civic Right. Some would even say there is a Right of Nations. Grotius argues, “If a citizen who breaches civil Right for his own immediate interest destroys the fabric which protects the enduring interests of himself and his posterity, so a people that violates natural rights and the rights of nations, undermines the supports of its own future tranquility.”

In his discussion of what is Right, Grotius asks the followup question, what is Just? For Rightness and Justice are inextricably linked. “’Right’ in this context means simply, what is just – ‘just’ being understood in a negative rather than a positive sense, to mean ‘what is not unjust.’ ‘Unjust,’ in turn, means what is inconsistent with the nature of a society of rational beings.”

Grotius, who refers often to historical and theological sources, quotes Aristotle on this issue of Right. Natural and Voluntary Rights, which roughly correspond to the Hebrew conception of natural right and positive right, are concerned with man “obliging us to do what is correct.” This involves virtues other than mere justice, because he uses the distinct phrase “what is correct” and not “what is just”.

On a very basic level, what is just and what is correct are close enough the same that we could use the terms interchangeably. However, sometimes other virtues supercede what is in fact just. In such cases, it may align more with the character of God to intervene in situations in ways other than the meting out of justice. One thinks of Christ’s atonement on the cross. Justice demands eternal damnation for all humanity. However, what is correct to the nature of God supercedes what God’s justice demands. That is, that some portion of humanity be reconciled to Christ. The question then, which most reformers dealt with, is how are God’s other attributes (mercy, justice, righteousness, sovereignty) fully satisfied in all cases?

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Lutheran Reformer Philipp Melanchthon structured his theological formulations according to Martin Luther’s dialectic between the law and the gospel and the evolution of Luther’s own political thought through natural law. Melancthon centers his exposition of lex moralis on the power of sin, work of the law, and the fruits born through the appropriation of God’s grace to believers and unbelievers. All laws of nature and of man hinge upon universally rooted judgments that men should worship God, cause no harm, and establish common use of and sharing of earthly properties.

Earlier in his scholastic career Melanchthon held to a more distinct division between the “two kingdoms” espoused by Luther. His view, heavily dualistic, distinguished between inner freedom and external obligations (651). It was easily possible to separate natural and divine laws between social and political morality. It wasn’t until the peasant Anabaptist uprisings that this distinction came into sharp focus for Melanchthon and he was able to integrate the two kingdoms of God and their respective laws through Natural Law philosophy.

Melanchthon argues that the Decalogue offers a locus for the entire lex moralis. The ten commandments refer not merely to the ten statements issued to Moses on Mt. Sinai, but rather the entire composition of the moral law in scripture. The ten statements engraved on the two tablets happen to be a summation of the rest of the law. The fourth commandment specifically speaks to the desire of God for the appropriation of order and government in creation instead of a certain ‘freedom’ which allows the wanton desires of man to run rampant in society.

The corrupted nature of man longs to live with no restraint, but it is in a society of no restraint that corruption runs wild and brazen not held in check by any restraining force. In such a society a man must always live in fear of his neighbor, uncertain of what injury might be done to him, unsolicited and unmerited, but imparted nonetheless. Such a fear for neighbor does not birth freedoms but rather controls, for a man is controlled by those he fears. Thus the very freedom of the society is its enslaving force.

Instead, freedom is “an orderly use of one’s own body and goods, by choice, in accordance with divine law and other true statutes” (654). God’s law is not enslaving, it is freeing; for it provides the appropriate restraint due the nature of divine law and statutes. Deuteronomy 4:1 states, “You shall heed the ordinances that I have commanded, that you may live!”

The second aspect to the fourth commandment relates to the nature of obedience to one’s particular office or calling and the virtue of gratitude necessary to display in order to properly accord the grace of God in that circumstance. Gratitude comprises the other virtues of truth and justice. First, when gratitude is expressed you are also expressing truth by rightfully acknowledging we are not proud and have boasted in our own strength in accomplishing some particular task. Secondly there is justice in returning that for which particular help was given.

1. Melanchthon states “the light of natural law was planted in man when he was created, but in the heathen it has been obscured.” 658. What does Melanchthon mean by heathen and how has the law been obscured?

2. How does Melanchthon describe poverty and its relation to private property? What is his critique of the Anabaptists?

3. Melanchthon defines freedom as an orderly use of one’s own body and goods, by choice, in accordance with divine law and other true statutes (654). Do you agree with his definition and does it founded in the right jurisdiction of God’s law?

4. Melanchthon argues that the closer one gets to absolute freedom the closer one gets to tyranny and social chaos. Is this justification for me to abandon my libertarianism?

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

In his treatise on the Christian’s response to Temporal Authority, Martin Luther states, “It is out of the question that there should be a common Christian government over the whole world, or indeed over a single country or any considerable body of people, for the wicked always outnumber the good…the world and the masses are and always will be un-Christian, even if they are all baptized and Christian in name.” (587)

Luther’s words here provide the foundation for which much of his work in the Reformation would arise out of for he portrays a clear distinction between the nature and purpose of royal and ecclesiastical rulership, a defining view of the eschaton which would later determine his soteriology, and the function of humanity and political community here on earth. Luther first claims that a thoroughly Christian government is inherently unattainable given the nature and disposition of man. He hints at the depravity of man and the outworkings of that depravity as inhibitor of peaceful human existence. Christian government, he claims, is characterized by a lack of need for “law and the sword” (587) which indicates less earthly government, and greater spiritual government. This certainly is a critique on the Constantinian turn and the supposed Christianity of the early Byzantine empire.

Luther argues for a distinction between the two types of government, earthly and spiritual, and that both must be permitted to remain. The former’s purpose is to externalize peace and retrain evil, the latter to promote righteousness, a negative and positive approach, respectively. Earthly government alone cannot bring about righteousness. The absence of earthly government prohibits earthly righteousness while the absence of spiritual government allows rampant wickedness. Thus, Luther makes a clear distinction between the purpose of secular institution and sacred institution.

True Christianity cannot and will not be attained by all those on earth at the same time. Thus, the rule of Christian government must in itself be restrained, because it cannot account for the nature of earthly humanity. The world never has and never will be populated entirely by Christians and thus Christian government is an invalid goal for the church. It is clear from this statement where Luther’s quarrel with the Catholic church in this respect arises. For the Catholic church to claim sovereignty over political authority is unfounded and unjust in Luther’s view and can never accomplish that which it sets out to achieve. A question we might ponder here asks if this is the source of the Founders idea of separation of Church and State? Luther and likeminded reformers saw a clear distinction between Christian cultural actualization arising out of Christian government and realistic redemption brought about by secular government guided by the holy spirit.

Luther states, “If anyone attempted to rule the world by the gospel and to abolish all temporal law and sword on the plea that all are baptized and Christian, and that, according to the gospel, there shall be among them no law or sword, or need for either, pray tell me, friend, what would he be doing? …Certainly it is true that Christians, so far as they themselves are concerned, are subject to neither” ...Is this correct?

2. How does Luthers view on Christian government (587) play into our understanding of separation of church and state?

3. Is Luther’s critique of trade and usury a critique of freemarket capitalism?

Jean Gerson: Papal Reconciliation & Church Power

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Writing amidst the great church conflict deciding the rightful claim to the papacy, Jean Gerson was appointed diplomat to reconcile the papal schism culminating in the council of Pisa in 1409. Traveling to Avignon in 1403, Jean Gerson’s initial task was to enter negotiations with the two rival popes claiming rightful appointment to the papal office. Unsuccessful in his attempt to achieve the desired mutual abdication, Gerson became a strong advocate for the convocation of the Council of Pisa in 1409 which officially deposed Benedict XIII and Gregory XII and instituted Alexander V to the office.

Gerson, initially opposed to conciliar authority, later espoused the convocation of council to issue unity among the contemporary church. His viewpoint adjusted such that the jurisdictional supremacy of the general council in matters of faith, reform, and the extirpation of schism on power held immediately from Christ by virtue of its representing the Catholic Church (518). His fundamental perspective also shifted on the rightful authority of conciliar convocation residing merely in rare emergencies to an authority that is ongoing with jurisdiction in regulatory, advisory, and disciplinary rights.

Gerson claims that Church power originates in what he calls ‘primary justice’. He claims that all rights, laws, jurisdictions, and dominions rest in a system of justice as complex as it is beautiful (527). He states, “The definition of justice is: a perpetual and constant will to assign everything its pro”whatper right. This definition applies first to the justice of God in his ordered relation to his creatures. God, indeed, is the only being that has a perpetual and constant will to assign everything what is proper to it.” This begs the question, “what is ‘proper right’”?

It would seem at first glance that the proper right for which everything is assigned is indeterminable because the only way to determine it is to work your way backwards ultimately to someone who decides each thing’s right without prejudice or qualification. This is indeed the case, as Gerson states, “God, indeed, is the only being that has perpetual and constant will to assign everything what is proper to it.” Of course, what is proper, is also determined by God and things then only have a right in the sense that a thing has being. However, Gerson borders dangerously close to logical circularity by stating “For everything has the right, or title, to possess whatever it may be that the absolute norm of primary justice prescribes that it possesses.” Justice is defined in terms of proper rights, which are determined by the norm of primary justice that it possesses.

1. --

Could it not be more effective to define justice in a different sense? Perhaps, in terms of goodness, not in terms of rights?

2. What are we to think of Gerson’s definition of church power and the distinction he makes between power of order and power of jurisdiction? 521

3. Is ecclesiastical power given immediately from god or mediated through men? 523

4. How does Gerson’s conception of community compare to Dante's view in Monarchia? 528

Dante Alighieri: Christian Unity, Empire, & Community

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Drawing upon a philosophical foundation rooted in the naturalistic tradition of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Averroes neoplatonism, and an overly romanticized existential interpretation of Roman historians and poets, Dante Alighieri seeks to unify human purpose and political community under the headship of a monarchy he claims is necessary for a perfect world order. Dante’s argument is based on three core principles. 1) Universal monarchy bears the potential of a unified intellectual substance necessary for full moral and artistic actualization in human and political community. 2) Divine ordination of Roman rulership as evidenced by the placement of Christ’s atonement in time and space under the virtue of Roman law was necessary for the universal reach of law to embrace all mankind. 3) Unified leadership under the church cannot be attained because of the disparate reaches of priestly and royal functions and thus necessitates the independent foundation of universal empire in order to accomplish any earthly political good.

Tracing the logical progression of Dante’s Monarchia it is clear that Dante bases his argument in the sovereignty of God and the purpose that everything brought into existence has some purpose to serve. Dante argues that man’s intellect and being coincide in an eternal existence (since man is surely eternal) and thus must have some purpose in operating without pause (since ‘eternal’ implies operation without pause by its very raison d’etre). It can thus be inferred that man’s existence serves an intellectual purpose, or at least has intellectual capacity and potential. Since mankind cannot achieve this potential individually, the capacity serves a universal purpose of collective political and artistic engagement in creation through the broader scope of human community.

How does this community form and function? That is the question Dante seeks to answer. He seems to suggest that it can only be achieved through universal peace and concord, which are the conditions necessary for the advancement of human flourishing. Hebrews 2:7. The question then becomes how can universal peace be achieved? Dante argues through absolute justice. Absolute justice can only be represented in absolute monarchy. Thus, absolute monarchy is necessary for the world. (417)

In ever scale of community rulership is inherently demanded for the successful operation of that community and for its flourishing. As part of its nature, a community must have a head; that is, one who rises above the others without qualification and whose word must be obeyed in order to provide mutual sustenance. Equality itself was issued as curse to humanity, endowing every community with certain unequal justice. Thus is the paradox. With equality comes inequality. And in unequal societies flourishing prevails. (416) Existentially this is proved time and time again. Examples proving the political and economic success of one extreme are all the great empires. Examples proving the demise of the other extreme found in socialist-based political states.

There are three major flaws with this entire line of reasoning.

1)Dante bases his argument that universal peace is “the most excellent means to securing our happiness.” (415)

2) He has no account for the opposite scenario based in an accurate understanding of humanity’s fallen nature in a postlasparian world. One who has born out the potential for ultimate good has equal propensity for ultimate corruption. The higher one climbs on the ladder, the longer and harder the fall. Look no further than the Roman Empire.

3) Dante misplaces his political foundation’s manifestation. Given the right conditions and the rare chance that the first two points are achieved, the physical manifestation of this Monarchia cannot be achieved through humanity. Rather, it is Christ who is the absolute monarch, ruling over creation in just the same way as Dante’s earthly emperor. The principle is right, but the structure and person is wrong.

--

1. To what end is the nature of human community? What does Dante say about the foundational basis formation of humanity?

2. What does Dante say is the nature of man and how does this influence his perspective of collective humanity

3. Is Dante’s interpretation of Luke 2:1, Gal 4:4 amd John 19:23 which he uses as Biblical justification for the Roman Empire and peace as highest order correct?

4. Dante says, “it is in the quietude or tranquility of peace that mankind finds the best conditions for fulfilling its proper task.” Is this Biblical?

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Rufinus the Canonist

Rufinus the Canonist’s major work was a response to the canonization of church law by Gratian, roughly 15 years after Gratian’s publication of his seminal text Decretum. Rufinus may have been influenced by Gratian during his tutelage at Bologna, but regardless offers a thorough commentary to the massive accumulation of the law of the church.

Gratian set out to systematize, analyze, and rationalize church legal history sourcing from all areas of the church. The resulting canonization was divided into three major topical sections arranged around one particular point. The first is a treatise on law and authority. The second, a series of case studies given about a legal situation. The third concerns worship and the sacraments. Rufinus, who responded to each of these sections in kind sought to exegete a theoretical development of law and brought extensive theological and literary training to bear upon his analysis.

Rufinus envisaged Gratian’s work as a division into divine-natural ordinances and human usages as well as a distinction between natural law, civil law, and a law of nations. Rufinus was able to situate each of these characters of thought into a well-developed framework of creation/fall/restoration which allowed him to develop an understanding of the relationships between natural and divinely-revealed law.

Nikophoros Blemmydes

Beginning his career through the political arena of Nicaean court circles, Nikophoros Blemmydes developed a respected political influence throughout his career. Even as a monk his political influence grew, ultimately leading him to reject an offerof the patriarchate from a former pupil, emperor Theodoros Laskaris II.

Although Blemmydes major work draws less on political observation and relies instead on moral narratives from Greek historical and biblical sources, it yet contains indictments for the operation and form of government. Blemmydes abstracts idealizations from moral philosophizing undernreath the rule of earthly princes and offers a glimpse as to how such societies justified their particular form of princely government and what they hoped to achieve as a result.

Bonaventure

Although Bonaventure spent only a short duration of his career as an acadmic, it did not lessen his interest in scholarly theological enterprise, especially against the advance of philosophical naturalism in the tradition of Aristotle. Bonaventure was quick perceive the looming tension between theology and naturalism and the largely unforeseen effects of naturalism on the separation of reason from faith. Recognizing what he saw as a connection between naturalism and the secular masters mendicant way of life, where reason becomes estranged from faith, self sufficient on its own ability to posit explanation and determination for life structure. The shift in his role from intellectual to pastor can be seen as emulating in part the key distinction that Bonaventure perceived in these two movements.

His pastorship and pastoral role as head of the Franciscans sought to lessen hostility from outside the order that was brought about through the relaxation of the “rule” of St. Francis, that is conditions of itinerant poverty. The practice of poverty became a distinction of use versus legal ownership which Bonaventure sought to reconcile, though maintaining strict adherence to absolute poverty.

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

The comparison of the role and authority of priest and king identifies a unique distinction between the perspective of Gregory the VII and Norman Anonymous. This discussion, which bears larger import to the ramifications on church and state relations in todays political climate, is tempered by the viewpoint of Bernard of Clairvaux, who offers a more compelling account of the authority given to these fundamental spheres of society.

Gregory acknowledges the division of the two powers, but claims that sovereignty, an invention of man in a postlapsarian world, is a derivative of “men ignorant of God who raised themselves above their fellows by pride, plunder, treachery, murder…at the instigation of the devil.” 245. The son of God, as the high priest making intercession for us, despised earthly kingdoms and offered himself as reconciliation for devilish earthly dominion and heavenly spiritual dominion. Gregory backs the claim of Pope Gelasius who said, “There are two powers by which this world is governed, the sacred authority of the priesthood and the power of kings. Of these the priestly is by so much the greater as they will have to answer for kings themselves in the day of divine judgment.” 246

Gregory refers to Augustine to substantiate his claim that men who try to rule over other men in equal status to themselves act in selfish pride. The priesthood, in an opposite way seeks to rule guided by the love of God, for the glory of God, and the profit of human souls. (246)

Norman offers an opposite viewpoint. “ To tell the truth, as the Lord’s Christ, the king may properly be called a priest and the priest a king. For it is a priestly function to rule the people in the Spirit of Christ, and a royal function to offer sacrifice and burnt offerings in the Spirit.” 254 The kingship and priesthood are likened to God and what Norman calls the Lord’s Christ, as mirror relationships in human authorities. The relationship God bears to Christ can be similarly likened to the relationship between King and Priest. Norman points to the precedent of David’s authority over the priesthood in the old testament as further substantiation for his point. The Lord, who gave David authority at the throne, instigated the lordship of that throne over all within the kingdom. David, the Christ-figure, the ruler, was given authority to rule even over the priests. Norman substantiates, “The Lord gave him, I saw, the lord who does nothing wrong but all things right. It was right then that the king should have authority and rule over priests. 256

The final viewpoint is that of Bernard, who mediates Gregory and Norman. In a series of letters addressing the Pope, Norman advocates a less divine appointment to papacy. He first questions the purpose of the elected supreme position, asking the question, “for what purpose?” 271. He refers to a similar question posed in Jeremiah 1:10, who responds “so that you can root up and destroy, plunder and put to flight, buildand plant.” 271 “ We will understand ourselves better if we realize that a ministry has been imposed upon us rather than a dominion bestowed.” 271 This seems to be a humbling qualification of the office and less pompous as his characterization of spiritual labor seems to indicate within the papal office. He suggests that the pope has been entrusted with a form of stewardship, not rule, as the following statement indicates. “It seems to me yo are entrusted with stewardship, not given possession…if you proceed to usurp possession of it, you usurp that which is Christs.”