Jean Gerson: Papal Reconciliation & Church Power

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Writing amidst the great church conflict deciding the rightful claim to the papacy, Jean Gerson was appointed diplomat to reconcile the papal schism culminating in the council of Pisa in 1409. Traveling to Avignon in 1403, Jean Gerson’s initial task was to enter negotiations with the two rival popes claiming rightful appointment to the papal office. Unsuccessful in his attempt to achieve the desired mutual abdication, Gerson became a strong advocate for the convocation of the Council of Pisa in 1409 which officially deposed Benedict XIII and Gregory XII and instituted Alexander V to the office.

Gerson, initially opposed to conciliar authority, later espoused the convocation of council to issue unity among the contemporary church. His viewpoint adjusted such that the jurisdictional supremacy of the general council in matters of faith, reform, and the extirpation of schism on power held immediately from Christ by virtue of its representing the Catholic Church (518). His fundamental perspective also shifted on the rightful authority of conciliar convocation residing merely in rare emergencies to an authority that is ongoing with jurisdiction in regulatory, advisory, and disciplinary rights.

Gerson claims that Church power originates in what he calls ‘primary justice’. He claims that all rights, laws, jurisdictions, and dominions rest in a system of justice as complex as it is beautiful (527). He states, “The definition of justice is: a perpetual and constant will to assign everything its pro”whatper right. This definition applies first to the justice of God in his ordered relation to his creatures. God, indeed, is the only being that has a perpetual and constant will to assign everything what is proper to it.” This begs the question, “what is ‘proper right’”?

It would seem at first glance that the proper right for which everything is assigned is indeterminable because the only way to determine it is to work your way backwards ultimately to someone who decides each thing’s right without prejudice or qualification. This is indeed the case, as Gerson states, “God, indeed, is the only being that has perpetual and constant will to assign everything what is proper to it.” Of course, what is proper, is also determined by God and things then only have a right in the sense that a thing has being. However, Gerson borders dangerously close to logical circularity by stating “For everything has the right, or title, to possess whatever it may be that the absolute norm of primary justice prescribes that it possesses.” Justice is defined in terms of proper rights, which are determined by the norm of primary justice that it possesses.

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Could it not be more effective to define justice in a different sense? Perhaps, in terms of goodness, not in terms of rights?

2. What are we to think of Gerson’s definition of church power and the distinction he makes between power of order and power of jurisdiction? 521

3. Is ecclesiastical power given immediately from god or mediated through men? 523

4. How does Gerson’s conception of community compare to Dante's view in Monarchia? 528