Jean Gerson: Papal Reconciliation & Church Power

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Writing amidst the great church conflict deciding the rightful claim to the papacy, Jean Gerson was appointed diplomat to reconcile the papal schism culminating in the council of Pisa in 1409. Traveling to Avignon in 1403, Jean Gerson’s initial task was to enter negotiations with the two rival popes claiming rightful appointment to the papal office. Unsuccessful in his attempt to achieve the desired mutual abdication, Gerson became a strong advocate for the convocation of the Council of Pisa in 1409 which officially deposed Benedict XIII and Gregory XII and instituted Alexander V to the office.

Gerson, initially opposed to conciliar authority, later espoused the convocation of council to issue unity among the contemporary church. His viewpoint adjusted such that the jurisdictional supremacy of the general council in matters of faith, reform, and the extirpation of schism on power held immediately from Christ by virtue of its representing the Catholic Church (518). His fundamental perspective also shifted on the rightful authority of conciliar convocation residing merely in rare emergencies to an authority that is ongoing with jurisdiction in regulatory, advisory, and disciplinary rights.

Gerson claims that Church power originates in what he calls ‘primary justice’. He claims that all rights, laws, jurisdictions, and dominions rest in a system of justice as complex as it is beautiful (527). He states, “The definition of justice is: a perpetual and constant will to assign everything its pro”whatper right. This definition applies first to the justice of God in his ordered relation to his creatures. God, indeed, is the only being that has a perpetual and constant will to assign everything what is proper to it.” This begs the question, “what is ‘proper right’”?

It would seem at first glance that the proper right for which everything is assigned is indeterminable because the only way to determine it is to work your way backwards ultimately to someone who decides each thing’s right without prejudice or qualification. This is indeed the case, as Gerson states, “God, indeed, is the only being that has perpetual and constant will to assign everything what is proper to it.” Of course, what is proper, is also determined by God and things then only have a right in the sense that a thing has being. However, Gerson borders dangerously close to logical circularity by stating “For everything has the right, or title, to possess whatever it may be that the absolute norm of primary justice prescribes that it possesses.” Justice is defined in terms of proper rights, which are determined by the norm of primary justice that it possesses.

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Could it not be more effective to define justice in a different sense? Perhaps, in terms of goodness, not in terms of rights?

2. What are we to think of Gerson’s definition of church power and the distinction he makes between power of order and power of jurisdiction? 521

3. Is ecclesiastical power given immediately from god or mediated through men? 523

4. How does Gerson’s conception of community compare to Dante's view in Monarchia? 528

Dante Alighieri: Christian Unity, Empire, & Community

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Drawing upon a philosophical foundation rooted in the naturalistic tradition of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Averroes neoplatonism, and an overly romanticized existential interpretation of Roman historians and poets, Dante Alighieri seeks to unify human purpose and political community under the headship of a monarchy he claims is necessary for a perfect world order. Dante’s argument is based on three core principles. 1) Universal monarchy bears the potential of a unified intellectual substance necessary for full moral and artistic actualization in human and political community. 2) Divine ordination of Roman rulership as evidenced by the placement of Christ’s atonement in time and space under the virtue of Roman law was necessary for the universal reach of law to embrace all mankind. 3) Unified leadership under the church cannot be attained because of the disparate reaches of priestly and royal functions and thus necessitates the independent foundation of universal empire in order to accomplish any earthly political good.

Tracing the logical progression of Dante’s Monarchia it is clear that Dante bases his argument in the sovereignty of God and the purpose that everything brought into existence has some purpose to serve. Dante argues that man’s intellect and being coincide in an eternal existence (since man is surely eternal) and thus must have some purpose in operating without pause (since ‘eternal’ implies operation without pause by its very raison d’etre). It can thus be inferred that man’s existence serves an intellectual purpose, or at least has intellectual capacity and potential. Since mankind cannot achieve this potential individually, the capacity serves a universal purpose of collective political and artistic engagement in creation through the broader scope of human community.

How does this community form and function? That is the question Dante seeks to answer. He seems to suggest that it can only be achieved through universal peace and concord, which are the conditions necessary for the advancement of human flourishing. Hebrews 2:7. The question then becomes how can universal peace be achieved? Dante argues through absolute justice. Absolute justice can only be represented in absolute monarchy. Thus, absolute monarchy is necessary for the world. (417)

In ever scale of community rulership is inherently demanded for the successful operation of that community and for its flourishing. As part of its nature, a community must have a head; that is, one who rises above the others without qualification and whose word must be obeyed in order to provide mutual sustenance. Equality itself was issued as curse to humanity, endowing every community with certain unequal justice. Thus is the paradox. With equality comes inequality. And in unequal societies flourishing prevails. (416) Existentially this is proved time and time again. Examples proving the political and economic success of one extreme are all the great empires. Examples proving the demise of the other extreme found in socialist-based political states.

There are three major flaws with this entire line of reasoning.

1)Dante bases his argument that universal peace is “the most excellent means to securing our happiness.” (415)

2) He has no account for the opposite scenario based in an accurate understanding of humanity’s fallen nature in a postlasparian world. One who has born out the potential for ultimate good has equal propensity for ultimate corruption. The higher one climbs on the ladder, the longer and harder the fall. Look no further than the Roman Empire.

3) Dante misplaces his political foundation’s manifestation. Given the right conditions and the rare chance that the first two points are achieved, the physical manifestation of this Monarchia cannot be achieved through humanity. Rather, it is Christ who is the absolute monarch, ruling over creation in just the same way as Dante’s earthly emperor. The principle is right, but the structure and person is wrong.

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1. To what end is the nature of human community? What does Dante say about the foundational basis formation of humanity?

2. What does Dante say is the nature of man and how does this influence his perspective of collective humanity

3. Is Dante’s interpretation of Luke 2:1, Gal 4:4 amd John 19:23 which he uses as Biblical justification for the Roman Empire and peace as highest order correct?

4. Dante says, “it is in the quietude or tranquility of peace that mankind finds the best conditions for fulfilling its proper task.” Is this Biblical?

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Rufinus the Canonist

Rufinus the Canonist’s major work was a response to the canonization of church law by Gratian, roughly 15 years after Gratian’s publication of his seminal text Decretum. Rufinus may have been influenced by Gratian during his tutelage at Bologna, but regardless offers a thorough commentary to the massive accumulation of the law of the church.

Gratian set out to systematize, analyze, and rationalize church legal history sourcing from all areas of the church. The resulting canonization was divided into three major topical sections arranged around one particular point. The first is a treatise on law and authority. The second, a series of case studies given about a legal situation. The third concerns worship and the sacraments. Rufinus, who responded to each of these sections in kind sought to exegete a theoretical development of law and brought extensive theological and literary training to bear upon his analysis.

Rufinus envisaged Gratian’s work as a division into divine-natural ordinances and human usages as well as a distinction between natural law, civil law, and a law of nations. Rufinus was able to situate each of these characters of thought into a well-developed framework of creation/fall/restoration which allowed him to develop an understanding of the relationships between natural and divinely-revealed law.

Nikophoros Blemmydes

Beginning his career through the political arena of Nicaean court circles, Nikophoros Blemmydes developed a respected political influence throughout his career. Even as a monk his political influence grew, ultimately leading him to reject an offerof the patriarchate from a former pupil, emperor Theodoros Laskaris II.

Although Blemmydes major work draws less on political observation and relies instead on moral narratives from Greek historical and biblical sources, it yet contains indictments for the operation and form of government. Blemmydes abstracts idealizations from moral philosophizing undernreath the rule of earthly princes and offers a glimpse as to how such societies justified their particular form of princely government and what they hoped to achieve as a result.

Bonaventure

Although Bonaventure spent only a short duration of his career as an acadmic, it did not lessen his interest in scholarly theological enterprise, especially against the advance of philosophical naturalism in the tradition of Aristotle. Bonaventure was quick perceive the looming tension between theology and naturalism and the largely unforeseen effects of naturalism on the separation of reason from faith. Recognizing what he saw as a connection between naturalism and the secular masters mendicant way of life, where reason becomes estranged from faith, self sufficient on its own ability to posit explanation and determination for life structure. The shift in his role from intellectual to pastor can be seen as emulating in part the key distinction that Bonaventure perceived in these two movements.

His pastorship and pastoral role as head of the Franciscans sought to lessen hostility from outside the order that was brought about through the relaxation of the “rule” of St. Francis, that is conditions of itinerant poverty. The practice of poverty became a distinction of use versus legal ownership which Bonaventure sought to reconcile, though maintaining strict adherence to absolute poverty.

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

The comparison of the role and authority of priest and king identifies a unique distinction between the perspective of Gregory the VII and Norman Anonymous. This discussion, which bears larger import to the ramifications on church and state relations in todays political climate, is tempered by the viewpoint of Bernard of Clairvaux, who offers a more compelling account of the authority given to these fundamental spheres of society.

Gregory acknowledges the division of the two powers, but claims that sovereignty, an invention of man in a postlapsarian world, is a derivative of “men ignorant of God who raised themselves above their fellows by pride, plunder, treachery, murder…at the instigation of the devil.” 245. The son of God, as the high priest making intercession for us, despised earthly kingdoms and offered himself as reconciliation for devilish earthly dominion and heavenly spiritual dominion. Gregory backs the claim of Pope Gelasius who said, “There are two powers by which this world is governed, the sacred authority of the priesthood and the power of kings. Of these the priestly is by so much the greater as they will have to answer for kings themselves in the day of divine judgment.” 246

Gregory refers to Augustine to substantiate his claim that men who try to rule over other men in equal status to themselves act in selfish pride. The priesthood, in an opposite way seeks to rule guided by the love of God, for the glory of God, and the profit of human souls. (246)

Norman offers an opposite viewpoint. “ To tell the truth, as the Lord’s Christ, the king may properly be called a priest and the priest a king. For it is a priestly function to rule the people in the Spirit of Christ, and a royal function to offer sacrifice and burnt offerings in the Spirit.” 254 The kingship and priesthood are likened to God and what Norman calls the Lord’s Christ, as mirror relationships in human authorities. The relationship God bears to Christ can be similarly likened to the relationship between King and Priest. Norman points to the precedent of David’s authority over the priesthood in the old testament as further substantiation for his point. The Lord, who gave David authority at the throne, instigated the lordship of that throne over all within the kingdom. David, the Christ-figure, the ruler, was given authority to rule even over the priests. Norman substantiates, “The Lord gave him, I saw, the lord who does nothing wrong but all things right. It was right then that the king should have authority and rule over priests. 256

The final viewpoint is that of Bernard, who mediates Gregory and Norman. In a series of letters addressing the Pope, Norman advocates a less divine appointment to papacy. He first questions the purpose of the elected supreme position, asking the question, “for what purpose?” 271. He refers to a similar question posed in Jeremiah 1:10, who responds “so that you can root up and destroy, plunder and put to flight, buildand plant.” 271 “ We will understand ourselves better if we realize that a ministry has been imposed upon us rather than a dominion bestowed.” 271 This seems to be a humbling qualification of the office and less pompous as his characterization of spiritual labor seems to indicate within the papal office. He suggests that the pope has been entrusted with a form of stewardship, not rule, as the following statement indicates. “It seems to me yo are entrusted with stewardship, not given possession…if you proceed to usurp possession of it, you usurp that which is Christs.”

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

In his treatise on Christian Rulers, Sedulius Scottus articulates a divinely instituted kingdom rule where a king is appointed as God’s representative minister to the people. “For what are the rulers of the Christian people unless ministers of the Almighty?...Accordingly, the most upright and glorious princes rejoice more that they are appointed to be ministers and servants of the Most High than lords or kings of men.” 222 Referring to the way David called himself a servant of the king, Sedulius makes a strong connection between the words of Solomon in 1 Kings 8:28 and the emperor Constantine.

Solomon, who says “consider your servant’s prayer and his entreaties, o lord my god; hear the hymn and prayer which your servant utters before you this day, so that your eyes both day and night may watch over this temple about which you said: ‘there will be my name!’’ is not claiming credit for himself upon his victories. Constantine makes similar cries to God when he thanks the Almighty God who had “deigned to make him the useful servant of his will.

Sedulius does not offer sovereignty as befitting kingship however. He says “He who has ascended to the summit of royal dignity by the grace of God should remember that he whom divine will has ordained to rule others should first rule himself.” 223 Instead, Sedulius claims all royal power has been divinely ordained for the benefit of the state. This power should be exercised with wisdom and veneration from God. Religion plays a chief role in the appropriation of such wisdom and veneration for by it is the establishment of good governance and the casting down of the Lord’s enemies. Solomon again is a source for understanding the role of wisdom in prudent counsel. In 1^st Kings Solomon is asked to request anything he desires. Even though just a boy, his response was intended not for himself but for those who fall underneath his protection and care. He requests of the Lord a discerning heart that he might judge the Lord’s people and distinguish between good and evil.

Sedulius argues for eight pillars of governance in royal affairs. Truth, patience, generosity, persuasiveness, correction, friendship, lightness of tribute, and equality of justice between rich and poor. The summit of royal power rests in these pillars. A wise ruler then will recognize the role of the church in the upholding of these pillars and seek out the blessing of the Holy Church in the subordination of his own personal interests. Therefore, a prudent ruler will seek first the “Kingdom of God…and all these things will be added unto him.” Sedulius says, “Hence, a prudent ruler should strive to accomplish those things which are pleasing to God, if he desires that God may bring about those things which are prosperous and glorious to him.”

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

John Chrysostom’s Twelfth Homily on 1^st Timothy strikes the reader as a pietistic interpretation of the Biblical view of wealth and private property. The O’donovan sketch in the summary of the chapter comparing John Chrysostom and Ambrose of Milan portrays Chrysostom as a master of rhetoric, though not a seminal thinker. It is clear in the homily on Timothy that Chrysostom the Rhetorician is employing his skilled faculties not Chrysostom the Intellectual.

Chrysostom questions the definition of what is called “goods”. He is right to question the assumption that those who possess goods must be called good themselves. However, he incorrectly applies the qualification of a good person as following from one who possesses goods. First, the two senses of ‘good’ that is used bear no resemblance to each other. One is used in a material sense (slaves, gold, silver) while the other is used in a qualitatively ethical sense (what constitutes the righteous ‘good’ in the character and nature of an individual). The material sense of the word implies that it is good to possess such quantifiable materials (again, physical aspect such as land, property, material resources). Such ownership is good because it allows certain freedom of movement within society and affords more easily the “quiet and peacable life” intended to be lived in simple holiness. However, it does not directly follow that while the benefits of such material can be called a good that it inherently derives such a quality from its nature. Thus we must allow the possibility that such ownership is not in fact ‘good’. The ethical sense which Chrysostom uses good refers to the motivations arising in an individual that determine what is done with those material goods. Thus has no bearing on the inherent merit of the goods themselves, and thus the material goods cannot be used qualitatively to be ‘good’ as their use can be. And therefore, Chrysostom’s argument that one who holds such goods is good is in fact not good.

A second major flaw in Chrysostom’s homily is his assumption that material wealth arises inherently from unrighteous activity. He does allow the possilibty that it could in fact, be sourced righteously, however he assumes the opposite. “…but can you, tracing [the source of your wealth] back through many generations show that the title was just? You could not avoid discovering the original source in someone’s injustice. Why? Because at the beginning God did not make one man rich and another poor.” (102). Chrysostom seems bent on discovering illegitimate origins of wealth, not satisfied with its apparent source until he can dig far enough in history to uncover it’s “real” origination. He says also, “suppose wealth in itself is just, free from the imputation of piracy”…as if piracy were the natural cause of all gold chests everywhere scattered throughout the universe.

Chrysostom’s major critique of wealth is that of private property. Pointing to the beginning of creation he points to the lack of property lines given to adam and eve, noting that everything is shared, and not one thing is clearly defined as one person’s and something else clearly defined as belonging to the other. He also elevates and glorifies common areas and public ownership of things such as streets, baths, sidewalks, and marketplaces. Their peaceableness relative to the jealousy-inducing private property is clearly enough for him to justify public ownership of all things and ascribement of unholiness to anything of private or individual ownership.

O’Donovan, Oliver and Joan Lockward O’Donovan, Editors. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)

The Christian church’s earliest history is a movement from localized organization to centralized organization marked by the crucial turning point of the Emperor Constantine’s conversion and the nationalization of Christianity as the official state religion. During the first four hundred years of church history Christians found themselves the subject of constant charges of antisocial and subversive behavior, antipolitical moralism, and sectarian organization that was ostracized and radicalized by local and state communities to the point of persecution.

The organization of the church politic and the church’s response to state politics grew out of a general apologetic aiming to clear Christianity from the charges of society. At the very least, the early Christian writers wrote to garner credible witness in defense against the customary charges given without the substantiation usually accompanying such accusation in later legally developed societies. In Justin’s first apology for example, he writes,

“For indeed we reckon that no evil can be done to us, unless we are proved to be evildoers, or shown to be wicked…nobody should think that [these] are unreasonable and daring utterance, we ask that the charges against us be investigated, and that, if they are substantiated let us be punished as is fitting.” (10)

Justin argues that the actions instigated against Christians rose out of passion and emotion vehemence against the Christian religion, and that the characterizations separating them from society were not properly formed out of reasonable judgment.

There are two significant consequences to this thought. The first consequence is that the early Christians began to recognize the perception they were creating by being primarily concerned with eschatological ends and the physical ramifications that bore upon their participation in the state and local political-economy. They were looking for the literal judgment of God because from their view the judgment of man had failed. Thus, they were a people oppressed, as Justin argues, and did not seek to take active part in or form opinions about the role of proper governance in society. In a sense, this would prelude Lactantius’ definition of justice as arising out of Christ’s two basic commands; Love thy God and Love thy neighbor.

The second major consequence is that it actually formed a statement on political thought, as least as far as the church’s role in political economy was concerned. In meting out justice for the accused Christians the early church fathers began to make qualifying statements about justice, due process of law, and the church’s relationship to the political sphere. Even though Justin seemed to put a great distance between the realm of body and soul, earthly and spiritual, church and polity, that distance was not infinite and thus a categorical separation completely distinguishing the two was not in the realm of his writing.

Justin’s letter to Diognetus serves to further articulate this second consequence. He articulates a view that does not classify Christians as distinct from their citizenship, but rather that their citizenship is augmented by their faith. Their conception of universal sharing bores down to their view that the cities they live in are not some place of their own (12), but rather belong to something greater and outside of their own personal ownership. It would appear that the Christians had an even better conception of public ownership, that is, citizenship, and collective stewardship in the political and city state which enhances the significance to which they attribute their life under a system of laws, rulership, and governance and what resistance to authority may appropriately look like.

Elazar, Daniel J. Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions Vol 1. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick. 1998

At each of the cyclical covenant institutions and renewals in the third constitutional epoch of Israel, God’s covenant is never fully changed or replaced but rather called to new life by the institution of new political structure. Elazar labels this a republican solution “designed to guarantee the continuation of limited, popular government along with renewed national energy, based upon the continued distribution of powers between the tribe, on the one hand, and the national authorities, on the other. Its republicanism is particularly marked since it was developed as an answer to the monarchists who argued that the only solution to the problem of effective government was centralized monarchy.”

This centralized monarchy enters the scene of Israel politic with the arrival of the third constitutional epoch and the ordination, or election, of the nagid. The Nagid, or together the negidim, are referred to by Israel’s prophets as “God’s high commissioners” or nesi’im “ God’s elected ones.” 357. With the advent of monarchical reign, however, we still do not see the abolition of covenant between God and his people. The institution of a king, or more appropriately the high commissioner, does not negate the other centers of power within the Israelite political system, mainly that of the prophets. At the heart of the nagid is the placement of the individual to rule in the stead of God. An indirect Theocracy replaces direct Theocracy.

Because of the overshadowing sovereignty and ruling authority of God, each particular monarchical regime must be anchored in God’s covenant. The concept of heredity was ruled out by the constitutional covenant, and particularly the limited form in which it was instituted. Each individual making claim to the throne had to demonstrate the presence of God’s charisma and national leadership to the state. In the Davidic tradition, this was fulfilled by personal charm, claim to God’s charisma, appeals to the people of Israel, and his personal image built by the military and musical success he enjoyed against the philistines and in the court of Saul, respectively.

The limited constitutional monarchy was enforced by other centers of power, namely the parallel authority of the prophets and priests. This relationship structure always provided tension. For example between the struggle between Samuel and Saul set the stage for political struggle in monarchic period. This nature of limited government reemerges in what we know as the separation of powers. The king does not have divine rights, but is bound both by the covenant and constitution both. In this light David is considered the first King of Israel, even though Saul was anointed the first head of the monarchical state. HE was rather more a part of the older federal republican tradition.

The end of the Tribal system in the from the first epoch of Jewish constitutional history signaled the transition to a framework of federated national polity underneath the association of the twelve tribes, which in turn set the stage for the third epoch’s monarchical institutions. The Mosaic paradigm of the second epoch presents a contrast to the Davidic paradigm in the third, which never was god’s intention, but was able to be satisfied still underneath the heged covenant.

Elazar, Daniel J. Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions Vol 1. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick. 1998

The account of Israelite government and history in the books of Joshua and Judges offer different expressions of God’s covenant forms and various governmental structures. One of the key political terms introduced in the Torah is Eved Adonai, the highest political leader of the Israelite nation. Constitutionally, a ‘prime minister’. Inherent in the concept of Eved Adonai is an understanding of the limitations of human political authority. The sovereignty of God the King over political organization underscores the rejection of monarchical reign as a legitimate political system.

Also inherent in the language of the Eved Adonai is the idea that leadership is not hereditary outside the priesthood. Again, calling for the sovereignty of God to move through the people of Israel, God selects each replacement for civil authority, beginning with the institution of Joshua as Moses’ replacement. This particular aspect of limited authority looks to the development of leadership in individuals through service to their country, and the divine instillment of what Elazar terms “charisma” into Israel’s leaders. The 17^th century puritans incorporated this aspect of Eved Adonai into the ordering of their colonies and wrote about this concept as the republican virtue. (240)

The Book of Joshua itself is constructed around the renewal of the covenant at three points. These markers are linear and correspond with the beginning, middle, and end of Joshua’s leadership over the people of Israel. The first renewing of the covenant takes place at their initial crossing over the Jordan and the erection of the stone altar. The second renewal takes place following the conquest of Canaan and the division of the land at Shechem. The third renewal is at Joshua’s farewell to the Israelite people once peacetime affords the families to return to domestic pursuits.

At each of these covenant renewals, the old covenant was not added to or amended but rather restored to its original form, essentially a conservative solution. Elazar calls it a republican solution “designed to guarantee the continuation of limited, popular government along with renewed national energy, based upon the continued distribution of powers between the tribe, on the one hand, and the national authorities, on the other. It’s republicanism is particularly marked since it was developed as an answer to the monarchists who argued that the only solution to the problem of effective government was centralized monarchy.”

Elazar, Daniel J. Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions Vol 1. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick. 1998

In describing the nature of covenant in Pentateuch literature Elazar examines the nature of each ensuing covenant God issues to the lineage and people of Israel. There are a series of covenants established with God’s people, some invoking previously established pacts that increase the constitutionalism of the law. The first mosaic covenant laid the foundations for the first polity in Israel, federated in the 12 tribes of Israel. These tribes were bound constitutionally but remained loosely aggregate and not constrictly bound. The essence of limited government existed in this first constitution because God himself would be considered the direct governor of all twelve tribes. Israel would eventually discard this loose constitutionalism for a regally established monarchy in order to mimic the physical power of other nations. Obviously, the centralization of this new government resulted in more authoritarian earthly figure, which reaped disastrous effects upon the nation of Israel as a whole.

When Moses returns from Midian to respond to God’s call to lead the Israelites out of bondage in Egypt, his first course of action is to seek out the elders of the Hebrew people and invoke the traditional covenants established with the patriarchs. The Hebrew elders rejected these old covenants, thus paving the way for the issuance of a new covenant at Mt. Sinai. By establishing this new covenant at Sinai God wanted to demonstrate his saving power by rescuing them from their Egyptian bondage. And secondly, to bring them out of slavery to become a free people who are able to capably consent to the covenant.

The nature of covenant must be made by two parties freely able to bind themselves in agreement. Covenants cannot be made by slaves because they require free consent, which a slave is not able to do. Thus, to establish a new covenant with Israel required that they be led out of bondage in order to fulfill the call to enter a new covenant. These newly freed people however would require a way to live as an organized society, something they were not privileged of doing bound as they were to Egyptian society.

Cultural organizational order is essential to the establishment of any covenant so that the covenant can be engaged freely (the stipulation for covenant) and not out of desperation. In order for a covenant to be entered into freely requires a certain willingness by both parties. Desperation denotes compulsion, thus a forcing of covenant agreement by obligation. Nowhere in desperation is there room to be freely selective and choosing of the covenant, and thus by consequence being motivated out of love and servitude. By their very nature, love and servitude are outward looking forces characterize by lack of self interest and thus interest in the other party.

Now we have arrived at a conclusion where the essence of the deuteronomic covenant is at the core of natural law. Biblical scholarship equates the essence of natural law with the essence of covenant, at the root of which is the moral law of the covenant. This moral ethic then bears the same character as covenant just by extension and therefore can be a natural outgrowth of the nature of covenant.

Elazar, Daniel J. Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions Vol 1. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick. 1998

In Daniel Elazar’s Covenant & Polity in Biblical Israel the concept of the covenant is applied to the foundations and origin of political systems modeled in different social structures throughout history. Elazar gains his understanding of covenant from Scripture and applies it to various types of understanding ranging from marriage covenants, social contracts, political origins, and cultural values & ethics.

Elazar links various forms of limited government to origination in the idea of covenant. He argues that the task of politics is not simply to organize societies that operate with certain degrees of civility and refinement. Instead, politics seeks to create culture that is compatible with human nature. In fact, he goes further to articulate the claim that politics and political life is not concerned only with the negative value of simply allowing human nature to exist, but to create conditions for it to actually flourish. I.E. for humanity and human nature to lead the best possible life. He derives this point from Aristotle who says, ‘people form political associations not only to maintain life but to achieve the good life.’ Many authors have picked up on this theme, especially Daniel Kemmis in his book the Good City and the Good Life, which analyzes politics role in creating and refining the human habitat which in turn shapes the ability of human nature to achieve a good life.

What Elazar does not describe is what this ‘good life’ consists of, which is crucial to understanding the proper ordering of covenant politics. He does introduce the two faces of politics, what he calls ‘justice and power’. Power is concerned with who gets what, when and how, an idea based off of Harold Lasswell. Justice is concerned with who should get what, when and how…and why. All people must determine to some basic degree what to do with the resources that can be culturally mined. Dividing this “capital” out and apportioning it in some way, regardless of its material or value (land, natural resources, authority, etc.) is what power is centrally concerned with. It is the “means by which people organize themselves and shape their environment to live.

A proper understanding of politics will be able to reconcile and synthesize these two values, which are difficult to get to coexist structurally together. Politics cannot be detached from the form and reality of the brokenness of human relationships. But it can also not be detached from justice, morality, and ethics. This is the point where the covenant aspect of politics informs and shapes our understanding. Covenant framework allows justice and power to be linked morally and operationally. This means that the two become pursuant of the other. Justice seeks power, and power seeks justice.

Kline, Meredith. Kingdom Prologue: Genesis Foundations For a Covenantal Worldview. (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006).

Man has from the beginning of time needed a way to live harmoniously to the greatest extent possible with other men and with God. In a prelapsarian world the degree to which that was attainable had no cap upon its value. In what Kline defines as “ the megapolis”, the fullness of covenantal relationship was to be achieved through an aggregate of city-life in which God’s epiphany as “glory spirit” was at the center.

Kline articulates a dualistic view of postlapsarian humanity and culture, and thus city-life, where earthly community and the descent of man is characterized by a common and unholy nature instead of regular and holy communion with God on the path towards fullness and completion. At the heart of this discussion is the question which aspect of the berith was influenced by the fall. Does the nature of the relationship between man and God change and thus indicate a need for reconciliation? Or is man’s inherent nature and essence reduced to a state of commonness such that his work is no longer considered part of God’s kingdom? Whether the relationship or our inherent nature was changed in God’s covenant with man or some combination of the two will determine our view of the purpose and destiny of man, culture, and the redemptive work of the gospel.

Kline continues the discussion through the particular emphasis of the city in postlapsarian creation. As an ordinance of common grace, the city is not redemptive in its nature. Kline fundamentally sees the city in the kingdom of God as an aspect of covenant community in a theocratic world. The focus of such a city was vertical, orienting man constantly in relationship to God. It was concentric. It had an axis about which the metapolis revolved. It fundamentally consisted of a heavenly focus constantly orienting man in an outwards direction away from himself and upwards into communion with God.

The particular method by which this city ceased to be is answered by the covenantal change. If indeed the covenantal relationship was at the root of the fall’s effects then the dynamic and structure of the city assumed a literal expulsion of man from this city. If the inherent nature and essence of man was the influence, then his desires for dominion and changed and caused him to seek horizontal movement away from the vertical city.

The shift in focus from vertical to horizontal brings up a natural disharmony within man because it is not the natural order of things. Throughout a history of civilization and architecture we see this discomfort manifested in a zealous desire to reorient ourselves and our architecture vertically. The most explicit (and arguably consequential) example is the episode of the tower of babel which is thoroughly analyzed for its ramifications on the structure and destiny of humanity in Kline. Wonderful examples still remain of ancient cultures who sought to orient themselves communally with gods in Egypt, Greece, South and Middle America, etc., but were limited in scope by their relative technology.

Modern cultures have erected temples to different gods with different technologies and are reaching unparalleled heights but are driven by the same fundamental notion: a recognition of disharmony in personal and cultural lives. One thinks of Dubai for example and the ongoing construction of SOM’s Burj Dubai, already the worlds tallest building and still climbing.

Kline, Meredith. Kingdom Prologue: Genesis Foundations For a Covenantal Worldview. (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006).

The disciplines of city and urban planning are rooted in the ordering of a civil and just society built on a particular understanding of man and how he needs to be governed. The storied history of design practice articulates a thorough understanding of the philosophical nature of humanity and aggregate forms of structured living. A brief overview of the city within history will demonstrate a wide variety of assumptions and philosophies about the nature of humanity, its end, purpose, and destiny. Ancient cities such as Ur, Uruk, Babylon, and Xanadu find their identity and origin in the search for the administration of social justice and the organization of cultural government.

Not only do these cities hold individual seats for the execution of social justice (such as courts, palaces, temples, and other religious and civic structures), their architecture and design says something concrete about humanity’s relationship to the gods and need for the promulgation and advancement of their own specific culture. This in turn indicates the individual human search and competition to exert power and authority over each other recognized in a position of anarchy and the resulting need for government espoused by Thomas Hobbes.

I am struck by the overwhelming comparison and Biblical account given by Kline regarding the ordination of the human city to these secular acknowledgments for the origin of cities given in the authoritative text for city planning, Raymond Unwins “Town Planning & Practice.” The Human City is described by Kline as an ordinance of common grace, originating in the order of sin and seen primarily as a postlapsarian response to the need for justice, government and protection in the life of Cain. The human city is neither a part of the kingdom of Satan (by establishment of the evil intentions of an ungodly man” p162-163) nor an institution ordained in the kingdom of God (as a temporal measure of common grace but not affording eternal salavation, the structural manifestation of which is the ‘kingdom of god’ 169) but instead a structural interim postlapsarian response to the need for God’s elect to be brought into the kingdom of God.

In this sense the human city, or polis, is defined in several categories:

1) The human city is the sum of man’s endeavours and the shape of his hope

2) The human city is a structure of temporal safety, not eternal salvation

3) The human city is the vehicle for justice and judicial order

4) The human city is a medium for governmental structure and protection of community

Kline clarifies that though the human city is a common grace ordinance and response to the fall, prelapsarian cultural structure would have assumed the form of city as well. Kline refers to this as the Metapolis, defined as the “eternal city of the great King.” The distinction is that God orally commands the city into existence in Genesis 4:15 by divinely pronouncing it as the structure through which God will execute justice and protection for Cain and his descendants, thus invoking governmental order through the authority structure of the family.

The cultural structures necessary for the institution of cities had already existed. Thus, these contributing factors provide the structure for the human city, but not the motivation, thus the impetus and essence of a city

1) Dominion mandate: the source for citizens is found in the command to multiply and produce offspring

2) Dominion mandate: the origination of the cultivation of resources leading to the materials for the physical architecture of the city

3) Dominion mandate: instituted the authority structure of human family, which when engaged in the cultural process is the source of a centralized government

While Kline’s ideas regarding the essence of the city being rooted in the justice and judicial order are compelling to a practical understanding of the urban planning, the contrast and criticism of neo-Dooyeweerdian and Kuyperian thought (and thus a holistic Reformational understanding of the purpose of culture and its institutions) provides significant barriers for the advancement and redemptive nature of the city. It seems that Kline, through his discussion of the city logically leads to a dispensational theology.